

## Message Text

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44

ACTION EUR-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10

NSAE-00 RSC-01 PM-03 SAJ-01 GAC-01 NEA-06 L-02 PRS-01

MBFR-02 ACDA-10 SY-02 RSR-01 /075 W

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R 101840 Z APR 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9690

SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY OSLO

S E C R E T USNATO 1781

LIMDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-81

TAGS: ASEC, NATO

SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN SECURITY CASE

REF: USNATO 1700, 5 APR 73

1. DURING 10 APRIL MEETING OF THE NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE, THE NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE INFORMED THE COMMITTEE THAT A FINAL REPORT ON THE OLE MARTIN HOYSTAD CASE WILL BE ISSUED IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. IT APPEARS THAT HOYSTAD PHOTOGRAPHED ONLY FIVE DOCUMENTS OF WHICH FOUR WERE NORWEGIAN NATIONAL DOCUMENTS.

2. THE FIFTH DOCUMENT WAS A COPY OF NATO CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM DATED 2 AUGUST 1972 FROM MR. VINCENT BAKER, COUNSELOR, POLITICAL- MILITARY AFFAIRS, USNATO, ADDRESSED TO MR. GEORGE ANDREWS OF THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF.

3. THE FOLLOWING IS A QUOTE OF THE DOCUMENT REFERRED TO ABOVE.

QUOTE:

SECRET

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AUGUST 2, 1972

BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

MR. GEORGE ANDREWS  
ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

DEAR GEORGE:

YOU AND OUR COLLEAGUES ON THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE  
MAY BE INTERESTED IN THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF A RECENT  
CONVERSATION ON MBFR BETWEEN MR. JAMES LEONARD, AN ASSISTANT  
DIRECTOR OF OUR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, AND A  
SENIOR SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIAL IN WASHINGTON.

MR. LEONARD OPENED BY COMMENTING THAT THE SOVIETS WERE MAKING  
A MISTAKE IN THEIR REPEATED EFFORTS TO DRAW THE U. S. INTO  
BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON EUROPEAN FORCE LEVELS, AND POINTED  
OUT A NUMBER OF THE REASONS WHY WE WOULD NOT AGREE TO ANYTHING  
THAT SEPARATED US FROM OUR ALLIES. THE SOVIET OFFICIAL  
QUESTIONED WHETHER WE REALLY WANTED NEGOTIATIONS AND ANY SORT  
OF AGREEMENT. MR. LEONARD ASSURED HIM THAT U. S. INTENTIONS  
WERE SERIOUS, BUT THAT WE WERE DETERMINED TO PROTECT BOTH OUR  
POLITICAL AND OUR SECURITY INTERESTS. HE POINTED TO THE VARIOUS  
ASYMMETRIES IN THE EUROPEAN SITUATION, CITING THE QUESTION  
OF REDEPLOYMENT TIME AS A PARTICULARLY OBVIOUS ONE WHICH WOULD  
HAVE TO BE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF IN ANY EVENTUAL AGREEMENTS. THIS  
LED THE SOVIET OFFICIAL TO LECTURE ON THE NEGATIVE REACTION  
WHICH THE WORD "BALANCED" IN MBFR AUTOMATICALLY PRODUCED FROM  
MOSCOW. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE  
REASONS FOR THIS REACTION, BUT SAID IT WAS A "FACT" AND URGED  
THE NECESSITY OF EVENTUALLY FINDING SOME OTHER LANGUAGE  
TO COVER THIS CONCEPT.

THE EMBASSY OFFICIAL SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE  
AUTHORITIES ON HIS SIDE GAIN SOME BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT  
THE U. S. REALLY WANTED TO ACHIEVE THROUGH MBFR. HE DEFENDED  
THE VARIOUS FEELERS WHICH THEY HAD MADE FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS  
WITH THE U. S. AS BASED ON THE NEED IN MOSCOW TO OBTAIN SOME  
REASSURANCE ABOUT WHAT WE WERE "REALLY AFTER" IN MBFR.  
HE WARNED THAT IF THE U. S. AND THE USSR DID NOT CLARIFY  
THEIR RESPECTIVE THINKING TO EACH OTHER BEFORE ACTUALLY SITTING  
DOWN AT THE TABLE IN A MULTILATERAL CONFERENCE, WE RISKED A  
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VERY HARMFUL FAILURE. HE RECALLED THE SURPRISE ATTACK CONFERENCE  
OF 1958 (DURING WHICH HE HAD HIMSELF BEEN IN GENEVA)  
AS AN EXAMPLE OF JUST THIS SORT OF SITUATION. THE U. S. AND  
THE SOVIET UNION HAD COME TO THE TABLE THEN WITHOUT PROPER  
EXPLORATION OF EACH OTHER'S ATTITUDES AND THE RESULTS HAD  
BEEN VERY UNFORTUNATE. "IF YOU TELL US", HE SAID, "THAT YOU  
WANT US TO REDUCE FIVE DIVISIONS AND YOU'LL REDUCE THREE  
DIVISIONS, THEN WE WILL CONSIDER THIS. IF IT'S NOT HARMFUL TO  
OUR INTERESTS, WE'LL ACCEPT IT AND THEN WORK OUT THE DETAILS;

BUT WE HAVE TO HAVE SOME IDEA OF WHAT IT IS THAT YOU' RE AFTER."

MR. LEONARD ASKED IF THE SOVIETS HAD GIVEN THOUGHT TO PROCEEDING WITH MBFR BY RATHER SMALL STEPS, POINTING TO THE RATHER STABLE SITUATION IN EUROPE WHICH IT MIGHT BE QUITE UNWISE TO DESTABILIZE WITH ABRUPT CHANGES IN FORCE LEVELS. THE SOVIET OFFICIAL ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT AS POSSIBLY HAVING REAL MERIT, EVEN THOUGH, HE AGREED, THE SOVIET UNION IN THE PAST HAD TENDED TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS FOR VERY SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS.

MR. LEONARD ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT SOVIET ATTITUDES WOULD BE ON VARIOUS TYPES OF CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES OF THE SORT THAT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE 1950' S AND, IN PARTICULAR, AT THE SURPRISE ATTACK CONFERENCE. HIS INTERLOCUTOR THOUGHT THE USSR MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONSIDER THEM.

MR. LEONARD ASKED WHAT SORT OF MEANING THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHED TO THE PHRASE " CENTRAL EUROPE" WHICH BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED WOULD BE THE AREA PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN FORCE REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS. THE EMBASSY OFFICIAL SAID IT SHOULD INCLUDE THE TWO GERMANY'S PLUS WHATEVER OTHER COUNTRIES IT MIGHT PROVE GENERALLY CONVENIENT TO ADD. THEY WERE WELL AWARE OF THE FRENCH POSITION AND WOULD NOT EXPECT FRANCE TO BE INCLUDED.

MR. LEONARD ASKED IF HE THOUGHT THE AREA COULD INCLUDE PORTIONS OF THE WESTERN SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THERE WOULD BE NO TROUBLE AT ALL, PROVIDED THE EASTERN U. S. WAS ALSO INCLUDED.

MR. LEONARD ASKED IF THE SOVIET SIDE WAS REALLY SERIOUS ABOUT PUSHING " EQUALITY" TO THAT EXTREME. THE ANSWER WAS YES. IF PART OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS COVERED, PART OF THE US SHOULD ALSO BE COVERED. THE OFFICIAL ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT AIR FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. ON THE RELATIONSHIP TO CSCE, HE SIMPLY REITERATED  
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THEIR WELL- KNOWN POSITION THAT THE CSCE SHOULD NOT TAKE UP MBFR.

I AM SENDING A COPY OF THIS LETTER TO ALL DELEGATIONS.

SINCERELY,  
VINCENT BAKER  
COUNSELOR, POLITICAL- MILITARY AFFAIRS

END QUOTE  
RUMSFELD

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

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